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CAROL VAN WAGONER, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
MARK O. VAN WAGONER, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
—oooOooo— 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Docket No. 880152-CA 
Priority No. 14(b) 
---oooOooo— 
PARTIES 
All parties to this appeal appear in the caption. 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Section 
78-2a-3(h), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). 
NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This is the husband's appeal from an alimony award entered by the 
District Court. 
ISSUE 
Respondent accepts Appellant's statement of the issue. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
No particular constitutional provision or statute is determinative of 
the outcome of this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff-Respondent Carol Van Wagoner (hereinafter 
"Mrs. Van Wagoner") does not dispute the Statement of Facts set forth by 
Defendant-Appellant Mark O. Van Wagoner (hereinafter "Mr. Van Wagoner").1 She 
believes, however, that the following additional facts are necessary to a full 
understanding and evaluation of the issue on appeal. 
The parties were married almost nineteen years ago, in September 
of 1970. (Stipulated Statements of Facts at 52, R. at 616, reproduced infra, at A-2.) 
During the tenure of the marriage, Mr. Van Wagoner attended law school, 
graduated, and became an associate employed by one of the largest and most 
prestigious west coast law firms, O'Melveny & Myers. In 1980, he moved to Salt 
Lake City {Id. at 510), believing that he could earn more money here with the law 
firm Greene, Callister & Nebeker than with the O'Melveny & Myers firm in 
*As noted by Appellant, the court reporter has been unable to locate any of her 
machine notes from the trial. The parties have arrived at a Stipulation concerning 
the facts, which is reproduced in the Addendum at A-2 through A-6. The parties 
have also stipulated that the Depositions of both parties may be considered as 
evidence by this Court. Additionally, the District Court's extensive Amended 
Findings of Fact are reproduced in the Addendum at A-7 through A-22. 
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metropolitan Los Angeles (App. Depo. at 7). Shortly before the parties separation, 
he left Greene, Callister & Nebeker to found the firm of Van Wagoner & Stevens. 
(Id. at 8.) 
During the two years prior to the hearing before the District Court 
on the parties' financial matters (/.&, 1985 and 1986), Mr. Van Wagoner averaged 
an earned income of at least $70,000.00 per year. (Amended Findings of Fact at 
516, R. at 447, reproduced infra, at A-7.) Additionally, at the time of the hearing 
before the District Court, he was in the process of handling on behalf of the Plaintiff 
a substantial wrongful death action against a major retail grocer. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A great deal of deference is accorded to the trial judge in domestic 
relations matters because the trial judge has had an opportunity to observe the 
parties and become familiar with their economic resources. The alimony awarded 
by the District Court will not be changed on appeal unless some manifest abuse of 
discretion or misapplication of law is clearly demonstrated. 
During the 19 years that these parties were married, 
Mr. Van Wagoner completed his undergraduate education, attended law school, 
became associated with a large Los Angeles law firm, and now heads his own firm 
here in Salt Lake City. Mrs. Van Wagoner, on the other hand, was found by the 
District Court to be earning a little less than $10,000.00 per year and has, according 
to Mr. Van Wagoner's own evidence only, the capability of earning $16,000.00 per 
3 
year. During the last twelve years of the marriage, Mrs. Van Wagoner devoted 
herself to raising the parties' three children and to the performance of various 
volunteer civic services, but she was not employed. Under these circumstances, the 
permanent alimony in the modest amount of $650.00 per month awarded by Judge 
Moffat is entirely consistent with Utah law. Mr. Van Wagoner has failed to cite a 
single case that actually supports his contention that permanent alimony was 
erroneous. 
Based upon the circumstances of these parties and the fact that the 
modest permanent alimony awarded was clearly consistent with firmly established 
Utah law, Mrs. Van Wagoner should be awarded the costs and counsel fees incurred 
by her on this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED ALIMONY AWARD IS PRESUMED 
PROPER AND WILL NOT BE MODIFIED ABSENT A CLEAR SHOWING BY 
THE APPELLANT THAT THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
OR WAS MISTAKEN AS TO THE APPLICABLE LAW. 
It is apparent from Appellant's Brief that Mr. Van Wagoner is not 
pleased with Judge Moffat's award of $650.00 per month in "permanent" alimony to 
his former wife. However, the fact that one of the parties to a divorce proceeding 
is dissatisfied with the District Court's rulings is not indicative either of the propriety 
or of the merit of those rulings; nor or such remonstrances unusual in the aftermath 
of the inherently emotional and psychologically traumatic divorce process. 
4 
i 
This Court and the Utah Supreme Court have, on innumerable 
occasions, held that while a divorce action is equitable in nature, the ruling of the 
trial judge is favored with a presumption of propriety and accuracy. It is only in 
those few instances in which the Appellant can clearly demonstrate a manifest abuse 
of discretion or misapplication of law that the Decree fashioned by the trial judge 
will be disturbed. Such a position is logically grounded upon the advantaged 
position of the District Court, who has observed the witnesses, heard the testimony, 
and become acquainted at least to a limited degree with the parties, their problems, 
and their properties. 
In tacit recognition of the fact that the Amended Findings of Fact 
entered by Judge Moffat are supported by sufficient credible evidence, 
Mr. Van Wagoner relies on the equitable nature of divorce proceedings in his 
invitation to this Court to revamp the alimony award. A similar invitation was 
refused by the Utah Supreme Court in Eastman v. Eastman, 558 P.2d 514 (Utah 
1976), with the observation that: 
We have many times stated that even though 
proceedings in divorce cases are equitable, in which this 
Court may review the evidence, due to the prerogatives 
and advantaged position of the trial court, we give 
considerable deference to his findings and judgment; and 
we do not disturb them unless the evidence clearly 
preponderates to the contrary, or he has abused his 
discretion, or misapplied principles of law. 
558 P.2d at 515-516 (footnote citations omitted). It is, therefore, incumbent upon 
the Appellant in a divorce case to demonstrate some clear abuse of discretion or 
5 
misapplication of law before this Court may act to revise any aspect of the original 
Decree. 
In view of the amount of discretion accorded to the trial judge and 
the requirement that a clear abuse of that discretion or misapplication of law be 
demonstrated as a condition precedent to any modification of the trial judge's ruling, 
the cases have frequently noted that the mere fact that a majority of the members 
of the reviewing court might, themselves, have reached a different plan of 
distribution than did the trial court, is insufficient to justify any modification of the 
original Decree. The Utah Supreme Court emphasized this principle in Christensen 
v. Christensen, 21 Utah 2d 263, 444 P.2d 511 (1968), noting: 
Whether we as individual judges would or would not 
have arrived at the exact same formula as to what the 
most practical and just treatment of the economic 
espects [sic] of this situation is not the question on this 
appeal. Even though it is the established rule that 
divorce cases being in equity, it is the duty of this court 
to review and weigh the evidence, it is equally true that 
we have invariably recognized the advantaged position of 
the trial judge and given deference to his findings and 
judgment, declaring that they should not be upset unless 
the evidence clearly preponderates against them, or unless 
the decree works such an injustice that equity and good 
conscience demand that it be revised. . . . 
444 P.2d at 512-13 (emphasis added, footnote omitted). 
This Court has ardently adhered to the standard of review 
consistently articulated by the Utah Supreme Court in divorce cases. For example, 
this Court recently stated in Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 98 Utah Adv. Rep. 58, 
767 P.2d 121 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), that: 
Trial courts have considerable discretion to adjust 
divorcing parties' financial and property interests. . . . 
Moreover, the trial court's actions are entitled to a 
presumption of validity. . . . Absent a showing of a 
clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion, we will not 
interfere with an alimony or property award. . . . 
98 Utah Adv. Rep. at 59, 767 P.2d at 122 (numerous citations omitted). Similarly, 
in its decision in Rasband v. Rasband, 80 Utah Adv. Rep. 32, 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988), this Court began its analysis with the observation that: 
This court will not disturb the trial court's award of 
spousal support absent a showing of a clear and 
prejudicial abuse of discretion. . . . 
80 Utah Adv. Rep. at 32, 752 P.2d at 1333 (emphasis added, citation omitted). 
Under the standard of review traditionally applied by both this 
Court and the Utah Supreme Court, the alimony award in this case is presumed 
valid and will be affirmed unless Mr. Van Wagoner has demonstrated that Judge 
Moffat has so clearly abused his discretion as to result in substantial prejudice or has 
misapplied the relevant law of this state to such a degree that the Decree entered 
is manifestly unfair and inequitable. 
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POINT II; APPELLANT HAS ENTIRELY FAILED TO MEET HIS BURDEN OF 
DEMONSTRATING SOME ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR MISAPPLICATION 
OF LAW; THEREFORE, THE ALIMONY AWARD SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
Although Appellant's Brief makes clear Mr. Van Wagoner's 
subjective dissatisfaction with the alimony award entered by Judge Moffat, it wholly 
fails to delineate a single instance in which the District Court either abused its 
discretion or misapplied the relevant law of this state. Mr. Van Wagoner candidly 
acknowledges that he has been unable to find, to support his appeal, any "Utah case 
[which] has reversed a trial court's award of permanent alimony." (App. Br. at 12.) 
Faced with the absence of any analogous cases, Mr. Van Wagoner cites a series of 
Utah cases in which the trial court's failure to award permanent alimony was 
reversed. He then makes the logically unsound argument that since the circumstances 
of these parties do not meet some of the factors held in those cases to require the 
reversal of the failure to award permanent alimony, the District Court's award of 
permanent alimony in this case constitutes error. 
Even brief consideration of the principle relied upon by 
Mr. Van Wagoner demonstrates its unsoundness. As discussed in Point I, supra, 
Utah trial courts are accorded great deference in fashioning alimony awards and that 
discretion will not be supplanted on appeal absent clearly manifest abuse. It is 
obvious, therefore, that factual circumstances of sufficient severity to require reversal 
of a trial court's failure to award permanent alimony cannot reasonably be relied 
8 
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upon as defining the minimum circumstances justifying the award of permanent 
alimony. 
The criteria for alimony awards in Utah have been consistently 
articulated and adhered to by both this Court and the Utah Supreme Court. For 
example, within the past year, the Utah Supreme Court discussed the criteria to be 
considered by the trial court in determining alimony in Noble v. Noble, 89 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 3, 761 P.2d 1369 (1988), holding: 
We accord the trial courts broad discretion in awarding 
alimony so long as the trial court exercises its discretion 
"in accordance with the standards that have been set by 
this Court." . . . We require that a trial court, in setting 
alimony, attempt to provide support for the receiving spouse 
sufficient to maintain that spouse as nearly as possible at 
the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. In 
determining the amount of the award necessary to 
accomplish this aim, the trial court must make adequate 
findings and conclusions demonstrating that it has 
considered three factors: (i) the financial condition and 
needs of the party seeking alimony, (ii) that party's 
ability to produce a sufficient income, and (iii) the ability 
of the other party to provide support. . . . 
98 Utah Adv. Rep. at 4, 761 P.2d at 1372 (emphasis added, citations omitted). This 
Court, also, has discussed within the past year the relevant factors to be analyzed in 
awarding alimony, in cases such as Rasband v. Rasband, 80 Utah Adv. Rep. 32, 
752 P.2d 1331 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), in which it instructed: 
An alimony award should, to the extent possible, 
equalize the parties9 respective post-divorce living standards 
and maintain them at a level as close as possible to that 
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. . . . The 
Utah Supreme Court has articulated three factors that 
must be considered by the trial court in determining a 
reasonable alimony award: (1) the financial conditions 
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and needs of the requesting spouse; (2) the ability of the 
requesting spouse to produce a sufficient income for 
himself or herself; and (3) the ability of the other spouse 
to provide support. . . . 
80 Utah Adv. Rep. at 32, 752 P.2d at 1333 (emphasis added, citations omitted). This 
Court went on, in that case, to reverse the trial court's failure to award permanent 
alimony. 
As found by the District Court, Mr. Van Wagoner is a skillful and 
prominent civil litigator whose income in 1985 and 1986 averaged at least $70,000.00 
per year exclusive of his substantial contingent fee in a major wrongful death case. 
On the other hand, Mrs. Van Wagoner was found by the District Court to be 
earning $9,600.00 per year.2 On this appeal, Mr. Van Wagoner argues that 
Mrs. Van Wagoner could earn $16,000.00 per year as a school teacher if she 
obtained the required certificate.3 Even assuming the accuracy of the $16,000.00 per 
year figure alleged by Mr. Van Wagoner, it is blatantly obvious that his annual 
income (in excess of $70,000.00 per year) is immensely greater than hers (which he 
claims is $16,000.00 per year and which the trial court found to be $9,600.00 per 
year). 
2The District Court's finding is expressed in terms of a monthly income of 
$800.00 per month. (Amended Findings of Fact at 516, R. at 447, reproduced infra, 
at A-7.) 
3The trial court made no such finding of fact, but Respondent does not believe 
that the $500.00 per month disparity between the actual income found by the trial 
court and the alleged potential income claimed by Appellant is material to the \ 
outcome of this appeal. 
10 
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Both parties are, as the trial court found, healthy and capable of 
employment. This fact does not, however, diminish the disparity of income earning 
capability between the parties. Moreover, the disparity is not surprising given the 
circumstances of these parties. It must be remembered that, at the time of the 
marriage, Mrs. Van Wagoner gave up her plans for a career as a flight attendant. 
(Stipulated Statement of Facts at 53, R. at 617, reproduced infra at A-2.) The parties 
then moved to North Carolina so that Mr. Van Wagoner could attend law school 
and Mrs. Van Wagoner supported the parties by teaching. (Id. at 56). Following 
Mr. Van Wagoner's graduation from law school, he obtained employment first with 
a firm here in Salt Lake City and then with the O'Melveny & Myers firm in Los 
Angeles (Id. at J f 8 and 9) while Mrs. Van Wagoner remained at home rearing the 
parties' three children, who were born between 1975 and 1981 (Id. at f 2). For more 
than twelve years, Mrs. Van Wagoner was not employed, but instead devoted herself 
to the rearing of the parties' children and a number of volunteer civic projects. (Id. 
at I f 10 and 11.) 
Far from constituting an abuse of discretion, the District Court's 
award of modest permanent alimony in this case was appropriate and entirely 
consistent with firmly established precedent. In Olsen v. Olsen, 15 Utah Adv. Rep. 
8, 704 P.2d 564 (1985), the Utah Supreme Court was faced with parties whose joint 
financial condition it described as "an economic disaster." The Utah Supreme Court 
held that while the amount of the alimony award was well below that which would 
maintain the standard the living enjoyed by the wife during the marriage, it was 
11 
"reasonable in light of the limited family resources available to fulfill her needs." 
The Court ruled that it was error, however, for the trial court to have failed to make 
the award permanent. (15 Utah Adv. Rep. at 10, 704 P.2d at 564.) Likewise in the 
present case, Judge Moffat aptly noted that the parties would not be able to 
continue the standard of living that they had both enjoyed during the marriage 
(Memorandum Decision R. at 334), but this does not mean that it was inappropriate 
for Judge Moffat to award permanent alimony in the modest amount of $650.00 per 
month to Mrs. Van Wagoner given Mr. Van Wagoner's clearly demonstrated 
substantial income earning capabilities. 
Similarly, Judge Moffat's decision is entirely consistent with the 
numerous decisions of this Court, such as Andersen v. Andersen, 85 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 17, 757 P.2d 476 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), in which it was held that the trial court 
erred in failing to make permanent a $300.00 per month alimony award; and 
Rasband v. Rasband, 80 Utah Adv. Rep. 32, 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), in 
which this Court reversed as erroneous the trial court's failure to award permanent 
alimony in a reasonable amount. The District Court's permanent alimony award in 
this case is also in line with the ruling of the Utah Supreme Court in Paffel v. Paffel, 
48 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 732 P.2d 96 (1986), in which it was faced with a husband's 
challenge of permanent alimony. Based upon the disparity in the income producing 
capabilities of the parties, the Court rejected the husband's contention that the 
alimony awarded ought not have been permanent and upheld the award of 
permanent alimony. (48 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16, 732 P.2d at 104.) 
12 
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In light of the extreme disparity between Mr. Van Wagoner's 
earning capabilities (almost all of which were acquired during the tenure of the 
marriage) and those of Mrs. Van Wagoner (who was not required to work during 
the last twelve years of the 19-year marriage), the most appropriate response to the 
contention that Judge Moffat erred in making permanent the modest alimony award 
may well be the observation of the Utah Supreme Court in response to a similar 
contention by a dissatisfied husband in Frank v. Frank, 585 P.2d 453 (Utah 1978): 
How the [husband], or anyone on his behalf, could even 
suggest that a wife who had devoted 21 years to her 
marriage and reared a family should be turned out to 
subsist on her own is as discordant to our sense of justice 
as it was to the trial judge. 
585 P.2d at 455. This observation would appear equally applicable to the present 
case. 
POINT III: RESPONDENT SHOULD BE AWARDED HER COUNSEL FEES ON 
THIS APPEAL. 
Due to Mr. Van Wagoner's dissatisfaction with Judge Moffat's 
alimony award, Mrs. Van Wagoner has now been burdened with the cost of this 
appeal. Even before the adoption of express provisions such as Rule 33 of the Rules 
of the Utah Court of Appeals, and its counterpart, Rule 33 of the Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court, the Utah Supreme Court had frequently held that, in such 
circumstances, an award is appropriate to cover the added costs necessitated by the 
dissatisfied former spouse's appeal. For example, in Ehninger v. Ehninger, 569 P.2d 
13 
1104 (Utah 1977), the husband, disenchanted with the trial judge's award, appealed 
with the usual contention that it was unfair and inequitable. The original Decree 
was affirmed and the case remanded to the trial court for the assessment and award 
of attorney's fees incurred by the wife as a result of the appeal: 
Inasmuch as the plaintiff has been put to the necessity 
of defending this appeal, which we have found to be 
without merit, it is our opinion that she is justified in her 
request for a further award of attorney's fees in addition 
to the modest amount of $200 allowed her in the trial 
court. 
569 P.2d at 1106. To the same effect are Fletcher v. Fletcher, 516 P.2d 218 (Utah 
1980); and Baker v. Baker, 551 P.2d 1263 (Utah 1976). 
In view of the fact that not a single Utah case supports 
Mr. Van Wagoner's position, in view of the fact that the District Court in this case 
manifestly applied the criteria consistently articulated as applicable to alimony 
awards, in view of the great and obvious disparity of the actual income producing 
capabilities of these parties, and in view of Mr. Van Wagoner's own, personal 
knowledge of and familiarity with legal matters, it is appropriate, both under case 
precedent and the provisions of Rule 33 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, 
that Mrs. Van Wagoner be reimbursed for those additional expenses necessitated by 
this groundless appeal. 
14 
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CONCLUSION 
During this marriage, Mr. Van Wagoner completed his 
undergraduate education, attended law school, was associated with one of the west 
coast's most prestigious law firms, and now heads his own lucrative practice. 
Mrs. Van Wagoner, on the other hand, worked as a waitress and school teacher to 
fund his education, then devoted her life to rearing the parties' family and 
performing volunteer civic services, and now earns less than $10,000 per year and 
has, Mr. Van Wagoner alleges, the capability of earning $16,000.00 per year. Under 
these circumstances, Mr. Van Wagoner's contention that the District Court's award 
of permanent alimony at the rate of $650.00 per month was an abuse of discretion 
is entirely without merit. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of June, 1989. 
DART, ADAMSON & £ASTOG 
. :?J6/ 
Bert L. Dart 
PARKEN & KECK 
By JOHN D. PARKEN 
John D. Parken 
Counsel for Respondent 
Original Signature 
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EDWARD W. CLYDE 0685 
CLYDE, PRATT & SNOW 
Suite 200 
77 West Second South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 322-2516 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARK O. VAN WAGONER, 
Appellant and Defendant, 
vs. 
CAROL VAN WAGONER, 
Respondent and Plaintiff 
STIPULATED STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Civil No. D 85-3792 
Judge Pichard H. Moffat 
Come now the parties, through their respective attorneys of 
record, and stipulate that a transcript of the evidence is not 
available and this Stipulated Statement of Facts is made and 
agreed upon pursuant to Rule 11(g) of the Utah Court of Appeals: 
1. Plaintiff/Respondent <*as born in Seattle, Washington, on 
June 13, 1947; the Defendant/Appellant was born in Utah on March 
16, 1947. Both have been and now are in good health. 
2. The parties were married on the 9th day of September, 
1970. Three children have been born as issue of that marriage; 
namely: Erin Van Wagoner, born March 19, 1975; Gavin 
A-9 
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Van Wagoner, born January 25, 1978; Morgan Van Wagoner, born 
January 22, 1981• 
3. In the Spring of 1969 while Respondent was attending 
Brigham Young University, she applied and was accepted for 
training as a stewardess for Pan American Airlines. It was the 
intent of Respondent prior to meeting the Appellant to become a 
stewardess. While waiting for Pan American training school to 
begin in September, she met the Appellant. A romantic relation-
ship developed and the parties through discussions agreed that 
the Respondent should change her plans and remain in Provo. She 
did so> rescheduling the Pan American training school in Florida 
to the Summer of 1970. Thereafter through the fall of 1970 and 
the spring of 1971 Respondent enrolled in a three-semester 
program at the Brigham Young University, which was necessary for 
a teaching certificate. Such a certificate was obtained after 
the parties moved to North Carolina, and Respondent was certified 
to teach school in Utah and North Carolina. Respondent has not 
maintained the certificate and would need to be recertified if 
she were to teach. She has, however, completed four to five 
hours of the nine hours required for recertification. 
4. Immediately before her marriage to the Appellant, 
Respondent was working part-time as a waitress at Sambo*s Restau-
rant in Provo, Utah. The parties were engaged in 1970 and the 
Respondent quit her job at Sambo !s to begin the aforementioned 
three-semester program at BYU needed to obtain her Utah teaching 
certificate. 
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5. Appellant completed work for an undergraduate degree in 
history at the BYU. While attending school, he worked part-time 
as a teaching assistant in the History Department and part-time 
as a fry cook. The summer immediately before the marriage 
Appellant worked full-time as a fry cook and Respondent worked 
full-time as a hostess at a local restaurant. Appellant was 
accepted in the Fall of 1970 to study law at Duke University, 
6. In the summer of 1971 Appellant and Respondent travelled 
to Durham, North Carolina, where the Appellant began law school 
studies and Respondent began teaching. Between the fall of 1971 
and the spring of 19 74 Respondent taught elementary school in the 
Orange and Durham County school districts in North Carolina. She 
worked full-time as a teacher while Appellant was in law school. 
7. Appellant's law school expense was paid for by a combin-
ation of scholarship money from Duke University and gifts from 
his parents. 
8. After Appellant graduated from law school the parties 
moved to Salt Lake City, where he was employed by a local law-
firm. From this point forward Appellant began to provide almost 
100% of the marital income. 
9. In 1977 Appellant accepted employment with a Los Angeles 
law firm, O'Melveny & Myers and the parties moved to Los Angeles. 
The work assignment from that law firm enabled the parties to 
travel rather extensively, at the law firm's expense, to San 
Francisco, and an extended trip to Europe. 
10. In 1980 Appellant changed his employment by quitting 
I 
his position in Los Angeles and taking a position with a law firm 
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in Salt Lake City, Utah. The parties again, following plain-
tiff's employment, moved from Los Angeles to Salt Lake City, 
where they purchased a large home near the Salt Lake Country 
Club. From 1980 to the filing of this action for divorce Appel-
lant worked as a lawyer and Respondent remained in the home 
caring for the parties1 three children. During this period they 
purchased many items of furniture and three new automobiles. 
They also were able to continue to travel extensively. 
11. After their return to Salt Lake City in 1980 Respondent 
became involved in a number of volunteer projects, including 
serving as president of the local PTA, became a member of a book 
club and performed in a number of regular church assignments. 
12. The parties separated in June of 1985. 
13. In 1986, after the parties separated, Respondent began 
working part-time at the Salt Lake Tribune. She was working on 
an average of three days a week on an 8 hours a day basis and was 
paid $8 an hour. Her gross annual income from this was $9,984. 
14. There was testimony from a qualified witness that 
Respondent had favorable and immediate employment prospects as a 
teacher, and would be capable of making a minimum of $16,000 per 
year over a nine-month period. Appellant has chosen not to seek 
employment as a teacher and as a matter of personal choice has 
chosen her current work at the Salt Lake Tribune and to pursue a 
career in newspapers. 
15. Respondent's work at the Tribune is in the Promotions 
Department, and includes responding to teacher requests to visit 
classrooms as one method of teaching the teachers how to use the 
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newspapers as a teaching tool in the classroom. Respondent also 
from time to time works as a substitute teacher. She worked in 
this capacity a total of about 15 days in the last half of 1986. * 
16. Respondent started her work with the Tribune in October 
of 1986. She is paid around $40 per day and works part-time. 
17. The parties stipulate that the deposition of Appellant 
and the deposition of Respondent may be published and transmitted 
together with the exhibits as a part of the record. 
18. David Dorton, a valuation expert, testified concerning 
the value of the law degree earned by Mark Van Wagoner during the 
marriage. His testimony, which was recapped in Exhibit P-23, was 
that the present value of Mark Van Wagoner's law degree was the 
sum of $343,200. If it were tax adjusted, it would reduce the 
value to a present value of $247,100. 
Dated this ^ Q day of March, 1989. 
&^h)£kf 
Edward W. Clyde , A t t o r ^ y x o i ? ^ 
Appe l lan t /Defendant . 
Bert L. Darx, Attorney for 
Respondent/Plaintiff 
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B.L. DART (818) 
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f 
310 South Main S t r e e t 
Sui te 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-6383 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
CAROL VAN WAGONER, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MARK 0. VAN WAGONER, 
Defendant, 
AMENDED 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
REGARDING CUSTODY AND 
PROPERTY SETTLEMENT 
Civil No. D85-3792 
Judge Moffat 
oooOooo 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial en 
the remaining financial, issues on the 15th day of April, 1987, at 
9:00 a.m., plaintiff and defendant both appearing in person and 
represented by counsel and the Court having heard testimony from 
each of the parties and various witnesses and exhibits having been 
introduced and the matter having been argued and submitted and 
taken under advisement, and the Court now being fully advised, 
hereby makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On or about September 15, 198 6, this Court entered 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Divorce 
which reserved issues of custody and financial issues. These 
present amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law supplement 
those entered in September, 198 6. 
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2. Three children have been born as issue of this 
marriage, to wit: Erin Van Wagoner, age 12, born March 19, 197 5; 
Gavin Van Wagoner, age 9, born January 25, "1978; and Morgan Van 
Wagoner, age 6, born March 22, 1981 (collectively, the "Minor 
Children"). 
3. In January, 1987, plaintiff and defendant entered 
into an "Agreement regarding Civil No-. D85-3762" (the "Agreement") 
regarding the care, custody, control and visitation regarding the 
minor children. A true and correct copy of the Agreement is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and its terms are incorporated 
herein by this reference. The Court hereby adopts that Agreement 
and finds the terms of that Agreement to be fair, reasonable and 
just; and makes the terms of that Agreement part of these 
Findings. 
4. During the marriage the parties acquired certain 
household furnishings and effects and other personal property. It 
is reasonable, fair and just that the household furnishings and 
effects and other personal and real property accumulated by the 
parties during their marriage be divided as follows: 
a. Plaintiff is entitled to receive and after 
receipt shall be fully responsible for: 
(i) The 1977 Volvo automobile, 
(ii) The bank accounts presently in 
plaintiff's name. 
(iii) The sum of $500 which represents one-half 
of marketable securities held by defendant and valued at $1,000. 
2 
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(iv) All household furnishings and effects and 
other marital personal property presently in plaintiff's 
possession, except as provided in Paragraph 4(b)(iv) below. 
(v) One-half of the parties joint IRA account, 
which half is valued at $1,000. 
(vi) The Delta Airlines stock or any proceeds 
from its sale. 
(vii) The parties1 1984 income tax refund. 
(viii) The piano which should remain with 
plaintiff but in the event it is to be disposed of by the 
plaintiff at any time in the future or is to be stored for any 
period of time and not utilized for music lessons for the children 
it should become the property of the defendant and should be 
promptly surrendered to the defendant by the plaintiff free of any 
liens and encumbrances. 
(ix) All other household furnishings and 
effects and other personal property acquired by plaintiff 
subsequent to the separation of the parties on June 21, 1985. 
b. Defendant is entitled to receive and after 
receipt shall be fully responsible for the following: 
(i) The bank accounts presently in defendant's 
own name. 
(ii) Cash in defendant's possession. 
(iii) The marketable securities held by 
defendant valued at $1,000. 
3 
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(iv) All of the household furniture 
furnishings and effects and other personal property presently in 
defendant's possession and the following household furniture, 
furnishings and effects and other personal property presently in 
plaintiff's possession, namely, the JVC video camera, two pieces 
of artwork of defendant's choice, one Lladro sculpture of 
defendant's choice and defendant's tools other than tools necesary 
for yard care such as rake, hoe, shovel, etc. 
(v) Gavin's bedroom furniture should remain 
with Gavin so long as it is in his use but should be transferred 
to the possesion of defendant if not used by Gavin. 
(vi) All other household furnishings and 
effects and other personal property acquired by defendant 
subsequent to the separation of the parties on June 21, 1985. 
5. During the marriage of the parties defendant became 
involved in a wrongful death action involving a sign which fell 
from a Smith's Food King store. No order is made at this time 
concerning the proceeds, if any, from this litigation to which 
defendant may become entitled and at such time as this case is 
resolved defendant should notify plaintiff so that at that time 
the Court can make a determination of.whether any distribution of 
such proceeds is appropriate. 
6. Shortly before the filing of this action defendant 
received a partnership payout from his former law firm of 
$24,3 00. Defendant has shown the distribution of this fund 
reflecting that $19,168 went against joint debts of the parties, 
4 
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$2,402 went against defendant's debts, $1,930 went against 
plaintiff's debts and $800 went to a childrens* trip. The Court 
finds this distribution to be equitable and the funds having been 
expended, the Court makes no further order concerning these items. 
7. In 1986, following the filing of this action, 
defendant received a profit sharing payout of $10,788, Defendant 
has shown the distribution of these assets in a fashion which the 
Court finds to be equitable and the funds having been expended, 
the Court make no further order concerning these items. 
8. The parties own that certain real property 
situated at 2195 Parley's Terrace, Salt Lake City, Utah. It is 
the view of the Court that the parties even prior to the 
separation were living at a financial level that cannot be 
sustained. If that is a fact it is even more obvious that having 
separated they cannot continue to each be sustained at the same 
level that existed before. Based upon the current financial 
circumstances of the parties the Court finds that the house and 
real property at 2195 Parley's Terrace, Salt Lake City, Utah 
should be listed immediately for sale with Kay Berger, a multiple 
listing realtor. Plaintiff should be ordered to cooperate with 
Kay Berger in doing whatever Kay Berger desires or requests in the 
way of cooperation to assist in the sale of said property 
including but not limited to maintaining the residence in a neat, 
attractive and orderly fashion as it enhance its likelihood of a 
sale. 
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Until the house and real property at 2195 Parleys 
Terrace is sold, plaintiff should be responsible for payment of 
the first mortgage obligation and each of the parties should be 
responsible for 50 percent of the insurance and 50 percent of the 
taxes. If either party pays more than his or her proportionate 
share of insurance or taxes, the overpayment should become a lien 
against the defaulting party's proceeds from the home. 
Upon the sale of said house and real property the funds 
received therefor shall be escrowed and applied as follows: 
a. To pay all of the expenses of the sale such as 
real estate commissions, title reports and title insurance, 
proration of taxes and other standard closing costs. 
b. The note to Vivian McCarthy will be paid in 
full or assumed by the buyer. 
c. The balance will be allocated one-half to the 
plaintiff and one-half to the defendant. 
d. From defendant's one-half there shall be paid 
from the escrow in the following priority: 
(i) B. L. Dart, Esq., as provided for herein 
in paragraph 22. 
(ii) Defendant's obligation to the IRS. 
(iii) Defendant's obligation to Zions First 
National Bank. 
e. If either party shall have paid any debt or 
obligation of the other relating to said house and real property, 
-or relating to the two obligations to Zions First National Bank or 
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the 1985 income tax return on which the parties have a shared 
liability,;any such payment shall be reimbursed with interest at 
eight percent per annum from the time of the advance until the 
time of payment• The payment shall be made directly from the 
escrow. 
f. The balance of plaintiff's allocated share 
shall be distributed to plaintiff and the balance of defendant's 
allocated share shall be distributed to defendant. 
9. The parties own an interest in certain other real 
property located on the Southwest corner of Third South and West 
Temple Streets in Salt Lake City, Utah (the "West Temple 
Property"), which property interest should be awarded one-half to 
plaintiff and one-half to defendant. In the event of sale, the 
parties should share equally in the sales proceeds and in the 
future until such sale, each party should pay equally in the costs 
and expenses applicable to this property. In the event either 
party fails to pay his or her share of any assessment or 
obligation against the property ten days prior to the due date, 
the other party may pay such assessment and it should work a 
forfeiture of the non-paying party's interest in the property to 
the party making the payment. Defendant is currently the partner 
in the West Temple property and should provide to the plaintiff 
notice as soon as he receives it of any assessment so that 
plaintiff will have as much notice as possible of any assessment 
amount and due date. 
m 
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10• Defendant should be awarded all right, title and 
interest in and to his partnership interest in the law firm of 
Van Wagoner and Stevens, as well as his proportionate share of all 
assets and income of such firm. Provided that this award of the 
partnership interest does not supersede or in any way affect the 
provisions of paragraph 5 hereof relating to the Smith's Food King 
suit. 
The Court also finds that defendant's education 
and professional degree are not property interests and, as such, 
cannot be subject to division between the parties, but such 
education and degree are relevant and have been taken into 
consideration by the Court in the award of alimony hereinafter 
provided. 
11. Various debts and obligations have been incurred 
by the parties during the marriage which should be assumed and 
paid as follows: 
a. Plaintiff should pay, settle or otherwise 
compromise if not already done and should indemnify defendant from 
the following obligations: 
(i) All debts allocated to plaintiff under 
prior orders of this Court. 
(ii) All currently outstanding debts incurred 
by plaintiff subsequent to the separation of the parties on June 
21, 1985, in connection with charge cards or similar accounts. 
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(iii) The outstanding principal and interest 
on any loans incurred by plaintiff subsequent to the separation 
of the parties on June 21, 1985. 
(iv) All separate tax liabilities incurred by 
plaintiff subsequent to January 1, 1986. 
(v) All other debts incurred by plaintiff 
prior and subsequent to the separation of the parties on June 21, 
1985. 
(vi) One-half of the outstanding principal and 
interest owing to Zions First National Bank for a balloon payment, 
which half is valued at approximately $2,900.00. 
(vii) One-half of the obligation owing to 
Zions First National Bank regarding Taylor, which half is valued 
at approximately $10,825.00. 
(viii) One-fourth of the currently outstanding 
income tax liability for the 1985 tax year in the approximate sum 
of $2,000 subject to defendant providing documentation of the 
exact value of this obligation. 
b. Defendant should pay, settle or otherwise 
compromise if not already done and should indemnify plaintiff from 
the debts and obligations owing as follows: 
(i) All debts allocated to defendant under 
prior orders of this Court. 
(ii) All debts incurred by defendant prior and 
subsequent to the separation of the parties on June 21, 19 85 in 
connection with charge cards or similar accounts. 
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(iii) The outstanding principal and interest 
owning on any loans incurred by defendant subsequent to the 
separation of the parties on June 21, 1985. 
(iv) All separate tax liabilities incurred by 
defendant subsequent to January 1, 1986. 
(v) One-half of the outstanding principal and 
interest owing to Zions First National Bank for a balloon payment, 
which half is valued at approximately $2,900.00. 
(vi) One-half of the obligation owing to Zions 
First National Bank regarding Taylor, which half is valued at 
approximately $10,825.00. 
•(vii) Three-fourths of the income tax 
liability for 1985, which three-fourths is in the approximate sum 
of $6,000 subject to defendant providing documentation of the 
exact value of this obligation. 
(viii) Except as to the Smith's Food King case 
which is to be governed solely by paragraph 5 hereof, and is not 
modified hereby all liabilities incurred in connection with 
defendant's law practice. 
c. Any debts and obligations not listed in 
paragraph 11(a) or 11(b) above should be paid as follows: 
(i) Those incurred on behalf of plaintiff 
should be paid, settled and compromised solely by plaintiff. 
(ii) Those incurred on behalf of defendant 
should be paid, settled and compromised solely by defendant. 
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12. Except as specifically provided herein, and to the 
extent that assets have been disclosed by the parties, it is 
reasonable, fair and just that neither party shall have any 
interest in any property of the other, real or personal, tangible 
or intangible. 
13. It is reasonable, fair and just that plaintiff 
shall not at any time contract any debts, charges or liabilities 
whatsoever for which defendant, his legal representatives, heirs 
and assigns, or his or their property or estate shall or may 
become liable and will at all times keep and save harmless 
defendant, his legal representatives, heirs and assigns from any 
and all debts, charges or liabilities hereafter contracted or 
incurred by plaintiff, other than those debts specified in 
paragraph 11(b) above. Similarly, it is reasonable, fair and just 
that defendant shall not at any time contract any debts, charges 
or liabilities whatsoever for which plaintiff, her legal 
representatives, heirs and assigns, or her or their property or 
estate shall or may become liable and will at all times keep and 
save harmless plaintiff, her legal representatives, heirs and 
assigns from any and all debts, charges or liabilities hereafter 
contracted or incurred by defendant, other than those debts 
specified in paragraph 11(a) above. 
14. It is reasonable, fair and just that both parties 
shall promptly cause all joint accounts and credit cards, whatever 
type, to be cancelled or changed to separate accounts. 
m 
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15. So long as defendant is current on his obligation 
of support for;the applicable tax year, he should be entitled to » 
claim the two oldest children of the parties as dependents for 
state and federal income tax purposes and plaintiff should execute 
any documents necessary to allow these exemptions to be taken by 
defendant. Plaintiff should be allowed to declare the youngest 
child of the parties as her dependent. 
16. Both parties are healthy, able-bodied persons 
capable of gainful employment. Based upon the testimony and 
exhibits of the parties, the Court finds that plaintiff is 
currently employed three days a week at the Salt Lake Tribune 
earning a gross monthly income of $800 a month. Defendant is 
currently employed as a lawyer and during the past two years has 
averaged a gross annual income of approximately $70,000 each 
year. 
17. Based upon the current financial circumstances of 
the parties, defendant should pay to plaintiff for the benefit of 
the minor children of the parties child support payments in the 
amount of $500 per month per child which obligation should 
continue to the age of majority and thereafter to high school 
graduation for any child reaching majority before high school 
graduation. As a further obligation of support, defendant should 
continue to maintain the children on his currently existing policy 
of health and accident insurance. Medical, dental and orthodontia 
expenses not covered by insurance should be paid 1/3 by the 
m 
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plaintiff and 2/3 by the defendant. Defendant's obligation to pay 
support should terminate upon the death of defendant. 
18. Based upon the current financial circumstances of 
the parties defendant should pay to plaintiff as alimony the sum 
of $1,050 per month commencing with the month of July, 1987, for a 
period of one year, at which time alimony should reduce to $800 
per month for a period of one year, at which time it should reduce 
to $650 per month. Plaintiff's entitlement to alimony should 
continue until such time as plaintiff should remarry, cohabit or 
die or defendant should die, whichever event occurs first, but to 
be subject to modification pursuant to applicable Utah law. 
19. Alimony and support payments should be paid one-
half by the 5th of the month and one-half by the 20th of the month 
in each month they are due. 
20. It is reasonable, fair and just that plaintiff and 
defendant should each keep the other party informed, at all times, 
of his/her current resident address and telephone number, as well 
as that of his/her employer. 
21. It is reasonable, fair and just that the parties 
should execute and deliver all documents, provide all information, 
and take or forebear from all such action as may be necessary or 
appropriate to achieve the purposes hereof. 
22. Plaintiff should be awarded her attorney's fees 
and costs incurred in this divorce action in the sum of 
$17,24 6.23, which attorney's fees and costs the Court finds to be 
reasonable and based upon plaintiff's financial circumstances an 
m 
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amount for which plaintiff has need. Plaintiff's attorney's fees 
and costs should be paid by the defendant out of his equity 
derived from the sale of the home of parties. 
23. Until the residence is sold defendant should be 
ordered upon plaintiff's request to co-sign with plaintiff on an 
automobile loan to the amount of $4,000 to assist plaintiff in 
obtaining transportation for her and the minor children of the 
parties, which loan payment should be the obligation of plaintiff 
and repaid upon the sale of the residence. 
24. Because of past problems between the parties, the 
Court was asked to determine whether either party has the right of 
offset against the other for obligations between the parties. The 
Court expressly finds that neither party should engage in "self 
help" or offset and, specifically, defendant should not withhold 
either alimony or support from plaintiff based upon claims of 
offset for other obligations from plaintiff to defendant. The 
Court is not intending to supersede the ultimate right, under Utah 
law to offset, but is merely directing that the offset not be made 
without court approval insofar as alimony and support money is 
concerned. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes 
the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court has personal jurisdiction over plaintiff 
and defendant, and over the subject matter of this action. 
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2. Plaintiff is awarded the care custody and control 
of the minor children of the parties in accordance with the 
Agreement between the parties attached hereto as Exhibit "A." 
3. The real and personal property of the parties 
acquired during this marriage is awarded as provided in paragraphs 
4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 12 of the Findings of Fact. 
4. The obligations of the parties are to be assumed 
and paid on the terms and in the manner provided in paragraphs 11, 
13 and 14 of the Findings of Fact. 
5. Plaintiff is awarded support from defendant for 
the minor children of the parties in the amount and upon the terms 
provided in paragraphs 17 and 19 of the Findings of Fact, 
6. Plaintiff is awarded alimony from defendant in the 
amount and upon the terms provided in paragraphs 18 and 19 of the 
Findings of Fact. 
7. Plaintiff is awarded a judgment for the use and 
benefit of her attorney for fees and costs in the sum of 
$17,246.23, which shall be paid by defendant out of his equity 
derived from the sale of the home of the parties. 
8. Defendant is ordered to co-sign with plaintiff on 
an automobile loan to the amount of $4,000 pursuant to the terms 
and conditions provided in paragraph 23 of the Findings of Fact. 
9. So long as defendant is current on his obligation 
for support for the applicable tax year he shall be entitled to 
declare the two oldest children of the parties as dependents for 
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state and federal income tax purposes and plaintiff is ordered to 
execute any documents necessary to allow these exemptions to be 
taken by defendant. 
10. Each party is ordered to execute any documents 
necessary to effectuate the terms of the Decree of Divorce entered 
on these Findings of Fact ajid Conclusions of Law. 
DATED this 3 day of ^1n^i4iri —3^8 8. 
APPROVAL AS TO FORM: 
£u,-2*i$ A) s 
FAT 
t Judge 
EDWARD W. CLYDE 
Attorney for Defendan 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON H1NDLEY 
,CLERK 
3y ^L-CLtZhj^O ... 
Oiipoiy 'Clerk 
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